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Introduction
The health care sector has become one of the largest industries in most of the advanced
and medium-developed countries. It is also an outstanding case for a complex multi-tier
system of participating party incentives and frequently of conflicting interests. Since
Kenneth Arrow (1963) first addressed the issues of asymmetric information in health
insurance, several authors discussed the impact of asymmetric information on the
quality and cost of medical services. (e.g., Ellis and McGuire 1986, Ma and McGuire
1997, De Fraja 2000, Chalkley and Malcomson 2002 and Siciliani 2006, Barile et al.
2014, Beeknoo and Jones 2017, Frank et al. 2000) However, their papers focused on
one-sided asymmetric information between physicians and their patients or between
health care institutions (hospitals) and the health care funding agency. As is well-known
from the literature, one-sided asymmetric information in a transaction will result in
welfare loss and in cost efficiency loss. (e.g., Laffont and Martimort 2002) Should
regulators apply cost-based regulatory tools rather than incentive-based methods, the
loss becomes even larger.1 This loss can only be reduced, but cannot be fully annihi-
lated, even by incentive-based regulation.
This paper’s main contribution to the existing literature is the analysis of the
relationship of the participants in health care services and health care funding when
information asymmetry between them is two-sided. That is, both participants (the
patient and their physician, the doctor and their hospital, the hospital and the health
care funding agency) possess private information. (Herein the physician will be a “she”
and the patient a “he”.) This will lead to completely different results than what the
previously mentioned authors have found.
A circle model will be presented that starts from the relationship between the
physician and patient, then turns to the relationship between the physician and health
care institution. The model continues with the relationship between the health care
institution and the public health funding agency (PHFA) (the Social Security Admin-
istration in the U.S.) and ultimately with the government.2 Then the model chain
returns to the potential and actual patients through the relationship between the
government and the taxpayers who ultimately finance the health care system. A brief
discussion of the differences between Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries
and Western advanced countries follows, focusing on the level of information asym-
metry and its consequences in these two groups of countries.
Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Competence in Health Care Services
As mentioned before, the problem of information uncertainty in health care services has
been discussed by several authors, but Kenneth Arrow (1963), the pioneer of the topic
summarized who first designed a formal theoretical model, based on the economics of
information, to analyze the issues related to asymmetric information in health care,
mostly in health insurance services. Some of the additional important studies on this
1 See, Major and Kiss (2013) on cost-based pricing in regulated industries, especially in telecommunications.
2 In some countries, health care services are mostly privately funded. An outstanding case is the United States,
where a large share of the population can access medical services if covered by private insurance. However,
asymmetric information between the transacting parties will have similar effects as in publicly funded systems.
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subject are: Maynard and Bloor (2003), Choné and Ma (2004), Bolin et al. (2010), and
Leonard et al. (2013). These studies are considered as the point of departure but this
paper tries to dig deeper. The latest results of the theory of mechanism design will be
applied. (e.g., Maskin 2008 and Myerson 2008).
Patient–Physician Relationship
The relationship between the physician and the patient will be discussed first, focusing on
asymmetric information between them.3 It is obvious that the medical doctor does not work
in a vacuum and does not autonomously make decisions, but competes for better positions,
for prestige and, finally, for higher remuneration and cost compensation with other physi-
cians within the facility. At the same time, she is part of a team and a complex hierarchy of
interrelationships within her own institution that may also have a considerable impact on
treatment efficiency.When the paper starts discussing the physician-patient relationship, it is
obvious that this is a simplified approach to the complex interrelationships within an
institution’s medical staff. This simplification just serves as a more transparent description
of the transactions between patients and medical doctors.
No distinction is made between asymmetric information and asymmetric compe-
tence affecting the patient–doctor relationship in the analytical model that follows, but
it is assumed that the physician has private information and private knowledge about
medical assistance that results in moral hazard and adverse selection issues within their
relationship. That is, the patient cannot monitor the doctor’s effort level, and he has
only probabilistic knowledge about the doctor’s efficiency level.
The patient’s and the physician’s relevant variables and objective functions are presented
in the framework of one-sided information asymmetry first. That is, it is assumed that it is the
doctor who has private information with regard to the patient. However, these cases will not
3 Since patients can easily access health information on the Internet and on other online sources, information
asymmetry between patients and physicians regarding symptoms, even diagnosis and treatment options has
considerably decreased, especially in advanced countries. (Major and Ozsvald 2018). However, asymmetry
regarding competence (i.e., physicians know much more how to actually analyze and treat symptoms and
diseases) still prevails. Competence issues are not separately analyzed in this paper.
Table 1 Case (a): Inefficient doctor’s LLC and efficient doctor’s adverse selection ICC are binding
Patient
Efficient Physician Inefficient Physician
∂ πHui si; qið Þ þ 1−πHð Þui si; qið Þ½ 
∂qi
¼
dwi qið Þ
dqi
þ dc qið Þ
dqi
Physician performs at her first best level and
receives information rent.
Patient receives high quality and efficient
service.
∂ πLui si; qi
 
þ 1−πLð Þui si; qi
 h i
∂q
i
¼
dwi qi
 
dq
i
þ
dc q
i
 
dq
i
þ ν
H
1−νH
 dΔc qið Þ
dq
i
Inefficient physician’s service level is
distorted downwards, thus he receives less
than expected.
Patient saves more on payment.
Notes: LLC: limited liability constraint; ICC: incentive compatibility constraint. Optimum solutions displayed
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be discussed in detail because they are just the obvious repetitions of the classical informa-
tion asymmetry models (e.g., Laffont and Martimort 2002). Tables 1, 2 and 3 display the
optimum outcomes of these cases, because the paper intends to focus on those cases where
both the patient and the doctor possess private information. Consequently, they can and
usually will opt for a mixed strategy.
In order to simplify the analysis it is assumed that the patient’s health condition,
given by a dichotomous variable si, will improve sið Þ with probability πH or with
probability πL, respectively, if the doctor’s medical service is efficient or inefficient. It is
also assumed that πH > πL; and the patient’s condition does not improve sið Þ, it can even
deteriorate, with probability 1 − πH or 1 − πL when treatment is efficient or inefficient.
The doctor cannot foresee the patient’s post-treatment condition before starting
treatment. Only the probabilities given previously are known.
The quantity of examinations and treatment, measured in homogenous disease group
(HDG) scores is denoted by q which can be large qið Þ or small qi
 
. Another
Table 2 Case (b): Adverse selection ICC of the efficient doctor and moral hazard ICC are binding
Patient
Efficient Physician Inefficient Physician
∂ πHui si; qið Þ þ 1−πHð Þui si; qið Þ½ 
∂qi
¼
dwi qið Þ
dqi
þ dc qið Þ
dqi
Physician performs at her first best level and
receives information rent.
Patient receives high quality and efficient
service.
∂ πLui si; qi
 
þ 1−πLð Þui si; qi
 h i
∂q
i
¼
dwi qi
 
dq
i
þ
dc q
i
 
dq
i
þ
νH
1−νH
−λΔν
 
 d Δc qið Þ½ 
dq
i
Inefficient physician’s service level is
distorted downwards less than in case (a),
he receives somewhat less than expected.
Patient saves less on payment.
Notes: ICC: incentive compatibility constraint. Optimum solutions displayed
Table 3 Case (c): Inefficient doctor’s LLC and moral hazard ICC are both binding
Patient
Efficient Physician Inefficient Physician
∂ πHui si; qið Þ þ 1−πHð Þui si; qið Þ½ 
∂qi
¼
dwi qið Þ
dqi
þ dc qið Þ
dqi
Physician performs at her first best level, but
does not receive an information rent.
Patient receives high quality and efficient
service.
∂ πLui si; qi
 
þ 1−πLð Þui si; qi
 h i
∂q
i
¼
dwi qi
 
dq
i
þ
dc q
i
 
dq
i
Inefficient physician’s service level is at its
first best level, but does not receive an
information rent.
Patient receives what he expected.
Notes: LLC: limited liability constraint; ICC: incentive compatibility constraint. Optimum solutions displayed
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assumption is that the time span of the patient’s medical treatment is a linear function of
the quantity of examinations and treatment. For this reason, it is not explicitly plugged
into the model, but it will be incorporated in qi. Patient i, as principal, seeks medical
treatment from the physician (from his agent) and his valuation function on the
treatment is given by:
ui si; qið Þ−wi qið Þ−αpi si; qið Þ−Mi; ð1Þ
where ui(si, qi) is the patient’s benefit from medical assistance in monetary terms. The
patient’s benefit consists of several contributing factors, such as, e.g., his income under
healthy conditions, the value of his time for relaxation, the value of services he provides
for his family, etc.4
It is assumed about ui(si, qi) that
∂ui si;qið Þ
∂qi
≥0; ∂
2ui si;qið Þ
∂2qi
≤0 if qi∈ 0; q*i
 	
, or
∂ui si;qið Þ
∂qi
< 0; ∂
2ui si;qið Þ
∂2qi
> 0 if qi > q
*
i . These conditions imply that the patient attaches
higher value to a more profound and longer treatment up to a certain point, although his
marginal utility is decreasing along with the treatment, but her total utility starts
decreasing beyond that point.
wi(qi) is the patient’s lost wage or income due to the treatment for which
dwi qið Þ
dqi
¼ wi,
i.e., the lost wage is a linear function of the treatment’s time span and intensity. pi(si, qi)
is the patient’s gratitude payment he pays directly to the doctor for medical attendance
when medical services are funded and provided by public organizations. Alternatively,
it can be the financial compensation for health care services in private health care
facilities, for which ∂pi si;qið Þ∂qi > 0;
∂2pi si;qið Þ
∂2qi
≤0; α ∈ [0, 1] is the parameter signaling the
doctor’s professional position in the medical hierarchy normalized to one.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the patient pays a higher gratuity to the doctor—the
amount of which is directly related to the physician’s accomplishment—when
his health condition is improving than if his condition does not improve or it
deteriorates: pi si; qið Þ > pi si; qið Þ and pi si; qi
 
> pi si; qi
 
; Mi =∑nmi(n) is the pa-
tient’s total contribution (tax) payment to the PHFA up to the date (denoted n) when
he fell ill.
The patient seeks to maximize his net utility as given in eq. (1), observing the
doctor’s financial constraints. The patient cannot precisely monitor the doctor’s effort
level, nor does he know the doctor’s exact efficiency level. He only has the following
probabilistic information about his physician: the conditional probability of receiving
an efficient treatment, provided that the doctor exerts high effort, is νH, hence, the
probability of obtaining inefficient treatment despite the doctor’s high effort is 1 − νH.
In a similar vein, the conditional probabilities of receiving efficient or inefficient
treatment with the doctor’s low effort are respectively, ν L and 1 − ν L.
The physician as the agent also maximizes her own utility for which her evaluation
function is:
4 The factors of demand for health care services will not be discussed in detail in this paper. A profound
analysis of demand for health care is given by Grossman (1972), Picone et al. (1998) and Szabó (2015).
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vi qi; eið Þ ¼ ∑
N
i¼1
αbi þ αpi qið Þ−c qið Þ−ψ eið Þð Þ; ð2Þ
where N is the number of patients treated by the doctor, αbi is the share of the doctor’s
financial compensation (salary) directly related to treating patient i, and ci(qi) is the total
direct cost incurred by the doctor from treating this patient, while ψ(ei) is the doctor’s
effort cost for patient i. Thus, ∑Ni¼1αbi ¼ b is independent of the physician’s accom-
plishment. It is usually derived—especially in European countries—from the nation-
wide salary scale of public employees, which depends on ∑Ni¼1Mi and on other
exogenous factors.
The problems stemming from asymmetric information and asymmetric competence
between the physician and the patient are complicated by the fact that many of the
factors affecting their transactions are exogenous. For instance, ∑Ni¼1αbi ¼ b is deter-
mined by public agencies, while Mi =∑nmi(n) depends on the taxation rules and on the
patient–PHFA relationship.
The patient-doctor relationship is complicated even further by another factor. While
the physician’s net benefit decreases with increasing costs, the doctor—as an employee
of a health care facility—may inflate these costs. For example, she can order unnec-
essary diagnostics and other examinations the costs of which will then become a
bargaining chip in the negotiations between the health care unit and the PHFA. This
issue will be analyzed later. Because of these indirect effects, the factors affecting a
specific transaction by asymmetric information and competence—say, between the
patient and his doctor—may have additional impacts on other, but closely related
transactions. Consequently, the optimal solutions for the individual transactions can
only be derived by solving a system of simultaneous equations. The paper starts
analyzing the patient–doctor relationship keeping this fact in mind.
The patient cannot closely monitor the doctor’s effort level and he does not know the
physician’s efficiency level either. He only knows that the doctor incurs an effort cost of
ψ(eH) =ψ with high effort, or an effort cost of ψ(eL) = 0 with low effort. In addition, the
patient knows that the physician may operate at a high or at a low efficiency level with
the previously given probabilities. Her efficiency level is directly related to her effort.
As mentioned, treating the patient comes with treatment costs c(qi) besides the doctor’s
cost of effort. It was assumed that the doctor’s cost function is identical by type across all
of her patients, hence her treatment costs will only depend on the quantity qi of medical
services she provides to individual patients. As already briefly mentioned, the doctor is
capable of elevating her level of competence (that is, her efficiency), and that will reduce
her treatment costs. The high level of treatment will be denoted by qi, while the low level
of treatment is denoted qi. In a similar vein, c qið Þ denotes the costs of efficient treatment,
while c qi
 
labels the costs of inefficient treatment.
The doctor intends to maximize her own utility, therefore she will treat the patient
with high effort only if her participation, incentive compatibility and limited liability
constraints are respected.5 From the patient’s perspective, medical treatment is at
5 The doctor’s professional activity is, of course, influenced by legal, organizational and health care regulatory
rules and protocols, by moral codes and by other government regulations, besides her utility maximization.
However, these factors do not alter the fact that the doctor has an information monopoly in her relationship
with the patient, and also with her medical institution.
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optimum if he incurs the smallest amount of side payment (gratuity payment) at a given
level of treatment. This outcome can be attained if the doctor’s constraints are fulfilled
with equality in the largest feasible number.
The information rent of the efficient physician will be affected by the relative
strength of the impact of adverse selection and moral hazard. Different constraints
may be binding depending on the probability distribution of efficiency types and effort
level, and on the magnitude of the effort cost. Three different cases can be distinguished
depending on which of the physician’s constraints are binding. Which constraints of the
different efficiency types will be binding will depend on the relative magnitude of the
information rent and effort cost. The outcomes of these cases are presented in Tables 1,
2 and 3.
The physician’s incentivization becomes a much more complex task if the doctor
opts for a mixed strategy since she does not possess all the relevant information about
her patient and she also knows that the patient’s health condition will improve with less
than a probability of 1 after his treatment. Patients can also withhold information that
results in a two-sided information asymmetry between the patient and his doctor. The
doctor’s incentivization becomes perverse under a mixed strategy: it punishes the
efficient physician while it extends rewards to the inefficient ones. It is assumed that
the patient is also aware of the fact that his doctor exerts high effort, consequently, she
provides efficient service only with a less than unit probability. The mixed probabilities
of the physician can be calculated from the doctor’s indifference condition:
ρ πH αbi þ αpi−ci−ψi
 
þ 1−πL  αbi þ αpi−ci−ψi
 h i
¼
1−ρð Þ πL αbi þ αpi−ci
 
þ 1−πL  αbi þ αpi−ci
 h i
:
ð3Þ
That is, the doctor exerts high effort only with probability ρ ¼ αbiþαp iþαπHΔpi−c i2αbiþΔciþαΔπΔpi−ψi in
order to provide efficient service. She chooses a low effort level that may result in an
inefficient medical service with probability 1 − ρ, where pi is the doctor’s gratuity with
low effort, ci and ci are the costs of inefficient and efficient service, respectively, and
Δpi ¼ pi−pi, Δπ = π
H − πL, Δci ¼ ci ci.
Real life experience from several Eastern European health care systems attests that
the above assumption about the doctors’ mixed strategy is not a pure theoretical
assumption. Medical doctors exert only the minimum level of effort in order to save
their patients from dying but they do not want their patients to recover too quickly. If
patients stay longer at the hospital, the doctors can receive larger side payments during
that period and report higher costs of treatment to the PHFA (Table 4).
Only the case when the adverse selection incentive compatibility constraint (ICC), of
the efficient doctor and the limited liability constraint (LLC) of the inefficient doctor are
binding will be discussed.6 In addition, only the first order conditions of the patient’s
optimization problem will be presented here, with efficient service:
6 As in the previous analysis on one-sided asymmetric information, the other scenarios can be obtained in a
similar way, and are not described here in detail.
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d πHui si; qi
 
þ 1−πHð Þui si; qi
 h i
dqi
¼
dc qi
 
dqi
þ ρ
dΔc qi
 
dqi
0
@
1
Aþ dwi qi
 
dqi
ð4Þ
while in case the service is inefficient:
d πLui si; qi
 
þ 1−πLð Þui si; qi
 h i
dq
i
¼
dΔc q
i
 
dq
i
−
ρνH þ 1−ρð Þν L
ρ 1−νHð Þ þ 1−ρð Þ 1−ν Lð Þ
 

dΔc qi
 
dq
i
0
@
1
Aþ dwi qi
 
dq
i
:
ð5Þ
As can be seen from eqs. (4) and (5), the level of efficient service will be below,
while the inefficient service’s level will be above its optimum. That is, the efficient
doctor exerts only so much effort and service that the patient’s condition does not
deteriorate—but it does not necessarily improve either, while the inefficient doctor
over-treats patients.
Interrelationships between the Physician and her Medical Institution
Health care professionals work in different medical organizations with diverse working
conditions. For instance, there is a profound difference between the institutional
background and the interests of a primary care physician and those of a doctor who
works at a national clinic. The following analysis is simplified to the basic conditions in
Table 4 If the PHFA’s expenses of incentivizing the efficient hospital to exert high effort are below the
hospital’s information rent, the adverse selection ICC of the efficient hospital and the LLC of the inefficient
hospital will bind
PHFA (untrustworthy)
Efficient Hospital
∂Hh
∂qh
¼
μhπ
∂Khh
∂qh
 
þ 1−μhð Þ 1−ρð Þ
∂Khℓ
∂qh
 
þ 1−ρð Þ ∂ΔK
h
∂qh
 
μhπþ 1−μhð Þ 1−ρð Þ½ 
;
∂Hh
∂th
¼
μhπ
∂Khh
∂th
 
þ 1−μhð Þ 1−ρð Þ
∂Khℓ
∂th
 
þ 1−ρð Þ ∂ΔK
h
∂th
 
μhπþ 1−μhð Þ 1−ρð Þ½ 
;
Level of service is below its optimum
Inefficient Hospital
∂H ℓ
∂qℓ
¼ ρ ∂K
ℓ
ℓ
∂qℓ
 
−μh πþ ρ−1ð Þ
∂Kℓh
∂qℓ
 
∂H ℓ
∂tℓ
¼ ρ ∂K
ℓ
ℓ
∂tℓ
 
−μh πþ ρ−1ð Þ
∂Kℓh
∂tℓ
 
Level of service is above its optimum
Notes: ICC: incentive compatibility constraint; LCC: limited liability constant
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order to focus on the issues of asymmetric information between, and different interests
of, the health care staff and its institution. The health care facility will be labelled as the
hospital that requires health care services from the doctor.
As the principal, the hospital expects efficient treatment of her patients and high
effort in medical activities from the doctor (the agent) in this relationship. However, the
hospital cannot closely monitor the doctor’s effort level, nor can it exactly know the
doctor’s efficiency type. The management of the hospital only knows that in case the
doctor exerts high effort, her accomplishment can be efficient with probability ν H,
while it can be inefficient with probability 1 − ν H. Should the doctor exert low effort,
the probability of efficient or inefficient treatment will be ν L or 1 − ν L, respectively.
The hospital’s main interest is to maximize the number of patients (I =M ·Nj), but it
faces the following budget constraint: ∑Mj¼1∑
N j
i¼1Ki qið Þ≤ K; where Ki(qi) is the treatment
cost of patient i, which comprises both the flow expenditures and the investment and
maintenance costs—but not the wage costs—per patient, Nj is the number of patients
treated by doctor j, M is the number of doctors at the hospital, while K is the hospital’s
budget received from the PHFA except the hospital’s wage costs. The hospital’s
financial resources can be the planned amount pre-announced by the PHFA with
probability ω, but it can be below the promised amount with probability 1 − ω. These
probabilities are known both by the hospital and by the patients.
The doctor strives to maximize net utility that can be described with regard to the
patient-doctor relationship before, with one exception: the doctor seeks to receive the
largest amount possible from the hospital’s budget:
∑
i¼1
N j
αbi þ ∑
i¼1
N j
Ki qið Þ− ∑
i¼1
N j
ci qið Þ− ∑
i¼1
N j
ψi; ð6Þ
where
∑
i¼1
N j
αbi
is the doctor’s salary based on the salary scale of public employees, Ki(qi) consists of the
treatment costs of patient i incurred by the hospital,∑N ji¼1ci qið Þ is the total cost incurred by
the doctor while treating her patients, while ∑N ji¼1ψi is the doctor’s effort costs.
If the physician pursues a pure strategy, choosing either the accomplishment and
effort level of the efficient doctor or those of the inefficient doctor, the information
asymmetry between the hospital and the doctor results in similar solutions that could
already be seen in the patient–physician relationship. Therefore, the feasible solutions
of the hospital’s net benefit maximization are not derived here, since these can be easily
obtained by substituting the hospital’s benefit and cost functions into the previous
model on the patient–doctor relationship.
As shown in the patient–physician model previously, should the doctor observe an
unambiguous and trustworthy strategy from the hospital and she also opts for a pure
strategy, the hospital will extend positive incentives or punishment to the doctors which
will incentivize them to act according to their efficiency type and exert the expected
effort level. By extensive experience, hospitals in several countries rarely apply this
type of incentive regulation because the hospitals’ managements also face much
uncertainty and cutbacks of their institution’s public financial resources by the PHFA.
Two-Sided Information Asymmetry in the Healthcare Industry 185
Consequently, they struggle for survival. In addition, the hospitals’ managements
should have the financial resources to be able to pay the information rent to the efficient
doctors as the doctors’ incentive pay.
Being aware that the hospital’s public budget is uncertain if the doctor opts for a
mixed strategy, the hospital will only be able to extend perverse incentives. That is, as a
result of the hospital’s budget allocation, the efficient doctor will have a lower than
optimal accomplishment and exert the minimum level of effort, while the inefficient
doctor will have a higher than optimal accomplishment, and both of themmay strive for
enforcing side payments from their patients. Consequently, the hospital’s expenses will
exceed the optimal level.
Interrelations between the Government (the PHFA) and the Health Care Institutions
The objectives of different government agencies constitute a fairly complex bundle of
goals. The ministry or department of health care (with the professional organizations
backing) intends to enforce professional rules and considerations, while the PHFA
strives to meet the budgetary target directives of the central government. At the same
time, the PHFA plays its own game with the ministry of finance and with the parliament
in European countries, or with the Senate and Congress in the United States that
ultimately decide on the government’s budget. The analysis of the central health care
budget allocation is simplified to the informational and bargaining relationships be-
tween the PHFA and the medical facilities. Herein, these medical facilities are labelled
as hospitals, although there are crucial differences in the financing methods and
operational conditions among the hospitals, the outpatient clinics and the primary care
physicians. We only involve PHFA in this discussion.
The PHFA—the government agency responsible for financing public health care
from the government budget—sets the maximum budget for the hospital. The public
budget can be a high amount, Bh or at a low level, Bℓ independent of the hospital’s
achievement. The PHFA’s main objective is to maximize the difference between the
financial value of the hospital’s accomplishment—measured in HDG scores—and its
public budget. The hospital is capable of improving its cost efficiency level by effort,
but the PHFA cannot closely monitor the hospital’s effort level, nor does it know the
hospital’s efficiency level with certainty. It only knows that the hospital provides
efficient health care services with probability μh if it exerts high effort, or the hospital’s
efficiency level may still remain low despite its high effort with probability 1 − μh. The
hospital’s cost efficiency is affected by several exogenous factors as well. Hence, it can
attain high efficiency despite low level of effort with probability μℓ, or its efficiency
remains low with probability 1 − μℓ. It is an obvious assumption that μh > μℓ.
The hospital maximizes its net total revenue which is the difference between its
budget allocated to the hospital by the PHFA on the one hand, and its costs of operation
plus its labor, investment, and maintenance costs on the other. At the same time, the
hospital cannot be certain that it will receive the promised budget from the PHFA. It
only knows that the PHFA’s promises about the hospital’s budget can be trusted with
probability ω, but the PHFA is untrustworthy with probability 1 − ω. Then the
hospital must decide whether it opts for a pure or for a mixed strategy, where the
weights of its different strategy options can be calculated from the probabilities of
the PHFA’s trustworthiness or untrustworthiness, respectively. Since the hospital
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cannot be fully confident about the PHFA’s promises, it may opt for a mixed rather
than for a pure strategy by taking into account the probability of the PHFA’s
trustworthiness. Only the case of mixed strategies will be discussed here, for the
pure strategy cases are very similar to the ones presented with regard to the patient-
doctor relationship.
The net financial benefit of the efficient hospital from treating I ¼ M  ∑N jj¼1i j
patients with high effort is
Uhh hð Þ ¼ ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
Bhi; j− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
α jbi; j− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
Khh i; jð Þ t
h
i; j; q
h
i; j
 
− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
ψi; j; ð7Þ
with probability μh. With efficient treatment but low effort level it will be
U ℓh hð Þ ¼ ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
Bhi; j− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
α jbi; j− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
Khℓ i; jð Þ t
h
i; j; q
h
i; j
 
; ð8Þ
with probability μℓ, when the hospital is confident that it will receive its budget
promised by the PHFA. With the hospital’s inefficient accomplishment but its high
effort, and with trustworthy PHFA, the hospital’s net benefit is
Uhℓ ℓð Þ ¼ ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
Bℓi; j− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
α jbi; j− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
Kℓh i; jð Þ t
ℓ
i; j; q
ℓ
i; j
 
− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
ψi; j; ð9Þ
with probability 1 − μh. It will become, with low effort level and inefficient services,
U ℓℓ ℓð Þ ¼ ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
Bℓi; j− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
α jbi; j− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
Kℓℓ i; jð Þ t
ℓ
i; j; q
ℓ
i; j
 
ð10Þ
with probability 1 − μℓ, where I ¼ M  ∑N jj¼1i j is the number of the hospital’s patients, if
the size of the health care personnel in the hospital is M, and employee j provides
medical services to Nj patients. Public funds allocated to this hospital at a high level are
∑Mj¼1∑
N j
i¼1B
h
i; j, while the low level budget is ∑
M
j¼1∑
N j
i¼1B
ℓ
i; j. Total wages paid to the
hospital’s personnel are ∑Mj¼1∑
N j
i¼1α jbi; j, and total costs of medical services will be
∑Mj¼1∑
N j
i¼1K
h
i; j t
h
i; j; q
h
i; j
 
or ∑Mj¼1∑
N j
i¼1K
ℓ
i; j t
ℓ
i; j; q
ℓ
i; j
 
at high or at low efficiency level,
respectively. The hospital’s effort cost with high effort is ∑Mj¼1∑
N j
i¼1ψi; j.
If the PHFA is untrustworthy, the efficient hospital’s net financial benefit with high
effort becomes, with probabilityμh
Uhh ℓð Þ ¼ ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
Bℓi; j− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
α jbi; j− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
Khh i; jð Þ t
h
i; j; q
h
i; j
 
− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
ψi; j: ð11Þ
With low effort but high efficiency level the hospital’s benefit will be, with probability
μℓ
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U ℓh ℓð Þ ¼ ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
Bℓi; j− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
α jbi; j− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
Khℓ i; jð Þ t
h
i; j; q
h
i; j
 
: ð12Þ
Should the hospital’s accomplishment be at the inefficient level despite its high effort,
its net financial benefit will be, with probability 1 − μh
Uhℓ hð Þ ¼ ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
Bhi; j− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
α jbi; j− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
Kℓh i; jð Þ t
ℓ
i; j; q
ℓ
i; j
 
− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
ψi; j: ð13Þ
With low effort level it becomes, with probability 1 − μℓ
U ℓℓ hð Þ ¼ ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
Bhi; j− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
α jbi; j− ∑
M
j¼1
∑
i¼1
N j
Kℓℓ i; jð Þ t
ℓ
i; j; q
ℓ
i; j
 
: ð14Þ
For the sake of simplicity, the following notations are introduced:
b ¼ ∑Mj¼1∑N ji¼1α jbi; j;ψ ¼ ∑Mj¼1∑N ji¼1ψi; j;Bh ¼ ∑Mj¼1∑N ji¼1Bhi; j;Bℓ ¼ ∑Mj¼1∑N ji¼1Bℓi; j;
Khh ¼ ∑Mj¼1∑N ji¼1Khh i; jð Þ thh i; jð Þ; qhh i; jð Þ
 
;Khℓ ¼ ∑Mj¼1∑N ji¼1Khℓ i; jð Þ thℓ i; jð Þ; qhℓ i; jð Þ
 
;
Kℓh ¼ ∑Mj¼1∑N ji¼1Kℓh i; jð Þ tℓh i; jð Þ; qℓh i; jð Þ
 
;Kℓℓ ¼ ∑Mj¼1∑N ji¼1Kℓℓ i; jð Þ tℓℓ i; jð Þ; qℓℓ i; jð Þ
 
;
where the lower index of K stands for the hospital’s effort level and the upper index
represents its efficiency.
The probabilities of the efficient and the inefficient hospital’s mixed strategies must
be found first. The efficient hospital will choose the efficient strategy with probabilityπ,
while it will opt for the inefficient strategy with probability 1 − π, where
π ¼ 1−ωð ÞBh−ωBℓ þ 2ω−1ð ÞK
ℓ
h
ΔB− 2ω−1ð ÞΔKh : ð15Þ
The inefficient hospital opts for a strategy compatible to its (in)efficiency level with
probability ρ while it chooses the alternative strategy with probability 1 − ρ, where:
ρ ¼ ωBh− 1−ωð ÞBℓ− 2ω−1ð ÞK
h
ℓ
ΔB− 2ω−1ð ÞΔKℓ ; ð16Þ
where ΔB = Bh − Bℓ, ΔKh ¼ Khh−Kℓh, and ΔKℓ ¼ Khℓ−Kℓℓ, ΔKh ¼ Khℓ−Khh, finally, Δ
Kℓ ¼ Kℓℓ−Kℓh at the relevant values of (t, q).
Depending on the relative magnitudes of the information rent the PHFA needs to pay
to the efficient hospital to incentivize it for high effort and to provide medical services
at its efficiency level, on the one hand, and on the allocative efficiency loss from
reducing the required accomplishment of the less efficient hospital in order to retain
sufficient resources to pay the information rent on the other, different scenarios may
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occur. The amount of the hospital’s information rent is basically set by the relative
strength of adverse selection and moral hazard. Only the final results of the two
possible scenarios here that may occur in the relationship between the hospital and
the PHFA with double information asymmetry are presented.
It can be concluded from the previous results that the government agencies use
perverse incentives toward the hospital. They restrict the efficient hospital to a lower
than optimum level of accomplishment by providing less than optimal level of public
funding, while they allocate a larger than optimal budget to the less efficient hospital.
By doing so the government agencies incentivize the hospital to strive for a larger than
optimal level of accomplishment. Hence, the good types will be punished and the bad
types will be rewarded.
Another option occurs, if incentivizing the hospital for high effort would cost more
to the PHFA than the efficient hospital’s information rent. In this case, the limited
liability constraint of the inefficient hospital and the moral hazard ICC are binding. The
hospital’s information rent increases to such a level that it would not be a sensible
solution for the PHFA to deteriorate the hospitals’ allocative efficiency even further in
order to save money for the information rent. However, perverse incentivization of the
hospitals, incentivizing the efficient hospital to a lower than optimal level of accom-
plishment while inducing a higher than optimal level of performance from the ineffi-
cient hospital, does not cease to exist. Based on the previous analysis the readers can
conclude that the hospitals’ incentive regulation is not viable if the government
agencies responsible for the management of the public health care sector are not
trustworthy.
Asymmetric Information in the Relationship between Patients and the Governmental
or State Agencies
The active population of most European countries (also the active part of society
in several Asian, North and Latin American countries) pays a health care tax to the
public health care budget (managed by the PHFA) and they expect to receive high
quality service for their financial contribution. Actual and potential patients of the
health care system can hope for high quality service if the state (the national
parliament and the government) allocate a sufficiently large budget to the public
health care institutions. The government uses the financial contribution of former,
current and future patients to finance the medical institutions, but it is also
interested in keeping as large a share as possible of the health care contributions
within its budget to use for other purposes. That is, the government’s objective is
to maximize the difference between the citizens’ financial health care contribution
and its budget allocated to the health care system.
The economic and political factors affecting the government budget, the tax system
and public health care funding are interrelated in an even more complicated way than
what has been shown with regard to the other relationships affecting health care.
However, the analysis is simplified by focusing on the information and money flow
between patients and the government through the taxation and budget allocation
system. Neither the patients nor the government possess perfect information about
the other party’s type and effort level. Patients only know that government can be
trusted with probability ω, but it is untrustworthy with probability 1 − ω. The
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government only knows that the patients’ health care contribution can attain a high
level with probabilities σh or σℓ if the patients exert high or low effort, respectively, but
the patients’ financial contribution will be low with probabilities 1 − σh or 1 − σℓ at their
high or low level of effort, respectively. It is assumed that the government strives to
induce high effort from the patients. The objective function of patient iwill be similar to
the previous ones:
max
qi; j;ti; j
u Bið Þ−Eif g; ð17Þ
where Bi is the share of patient i from the health care budget, and Ei labels patient i’s
financial health care contribution. Since the government incentivizes the patient for
high effort, his participation constraint will be:
σh ωui Bhi
 þ 1−ωð Þui Bℓi −Ehi þ 1−σhð Þ ωui Bℓi þ 1−ωð Þui Bhi −Eℓi ≥0;
which can be rearranged to
2ω−1ð Þσh þ 1−ω½ uhi − 2ω−1ð Þσh−ω½ uℓi − σhEhi þ 1−σhð ÞEℓi
 
≥0: ð18Þ
The patient’s moral hazard ICC becomes:
2ω−1ð Þσh þ 1−ω½ uhi − 2ω−1ð Þσh−ω½ uℓi −σhEhi − 1−σhð ÞEℓi ≥
2ω−1ð Þσℓ þ 1−ω½ uhi − 2ω−1ð Þσℓ þ ω½ uℓi −σℓEhi − 1−σℓð ÞEℓi ;
that is; uhi −u
ℓ
i ≥
ΔEi
2ω−1ð Þ ;where ΔEi ¼ E
h
i −E
ℓ
i ;
ð19Þ
Let the total contribution of all patients be denoted E ¼ ∑Ni¼1Ei, while the total health
care budget allocated by the government is B ¼ ∑Ni¼1Bi. Then the government’s
objective function becomes:
max
Eh;Eℓ
ω σh V Ehð Þ−Bhð Þ þ 1−σhð Þ V Eℓð Þ−Bℓð Þ½ þ
1−ωð Þ σh V Ehð Þ−Bℓð Þ þ 1−σhð Þ V Eℓð Þ−Bhð Þ½ 

 
that is;max
Eh
σhV Ehð Þ þ 1−σhð ÞV Eℓð Þ−
2ω−1ð Þσh þ 1−ω½ Bh þ 2ω−1ð Þσh−ω½ Bℓ

 
:
ð20Þ
The government can collect the largest net revenue—which is the difference between
the patients’ total financial contribution and its own budget allocated toward health
care—if the patients’ participation constraint and moral hazard ICC are binding. To
simplify the analysis even further, it is also assumed that the patients are risk neutral.
Then Bh and Bℓ will be the solutions of the following system of equations:
2ω−1ð Þσh þ 1−ω½ Bh− 2ω−1ð Þσh−ω½ Bℓ ¼ σhEhi þ 1−σhð ÞEℓi ;
Bh−Bℓ ¼ ΔEi2ω−1ð Þ :
ð21Þ
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Solving the equations in (21) results in the government’s optimum level of public
health care spending at high or low levels of the patients’ financial health care
contribution, respectively:
Bh ¼ ωEh2ω−1 −
1−ωð ÞEℓ
2ω−1
;Bℓ ¼ − 1−ωð ÞEh2ω−1 þ
ωEℓ
2ω−1
: ð22Þ
With simple moral hazard—that is, when the government is trustworthy and its health
care budget allocation depends only on the magnitude of the adult population’s
financial health care contribution—the patients’ participation constraint and moral
hazard ICC will be:
σh Bh−Ehð Þ þ 1−σhð Þ Bℓ−Eℓð Þ≥0;
σh Bh−Ehð Þ þ 1−σhð Þ Bℓ−Eℓð Þ≥σℓ Bh−Ehð Þ þ 1−σℓð Þ Bℓ−Eℓð Þ: ð23Þ
Since both constraints will bind at optimum, the outcome will be:
Bh ¼ Eh; Bℓ ¼ Eℓ; ð24Þ
that is, the government—and parliament—will finance the public health care system up
to the amount of the population’s health care contribution. Comparing eqs. (22) and
(24) immediately shows that an untrustworthy government will allocate budget re-
sources to the public health care system in an amount that exceeds the optimum level if
the population’s health care contribution is at a high level, while it will provide a lower
amount to the health care system than what would be feasible at the given level of the
population’s financial contribution.
Conclusions
In the initial phase of transition, most CEE citizens hoped for a radical change in the health
care sector pursuing the implementation of a democratic political system and a market
economy based on rational principles.7 These expectations were supported by interna-
tional research which demonstrated that medical services, and in a broader perspective, the
whole health care industry can largely contribute to a country’s dynamic economic
development. (e.g., Deaton 2010, 2013). However, health care services in most CEE
countries have been deteriorating rather than improving since the political and economic
transformation started. To give just a few facts about this process, the average healthy life
expectancy at birth was between 71 and 78 years inWestern European countries and in the
USA or Canada, while it stood at 62–68 years in CEE countries in 2015 (World Health
Organization 2016). Themortality rate of cancer patients was between 56 and 62% inCEE
countries (except for the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, where the mortality rate
was 45 and 51%), while it was between 38 and 48% in the Western and Southern
European countries and the U.S. (World Cancer Report 2014 2015). The average
7 A more detailed analysis on the Hungarian and other CEE health care systems can be found in Kornai
(1998), and Kornai and Eggleston (2004).
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percentage share of preventable death in light of of current medical knowledge and
technology was 33% in the European Union, while it ranged between 39 and 50% in
the EU’s CEEmember countries, except for Poland and Slovenia where it was between 32
and 33%. (Eurostat News Release 2016)
This paper analyzed only one of the decisive features of the health care sector, the
information asymmetry among the transacting parties in health care and between the
medical facilities and the government agencies, which is more prevalent in CEE
countries than, for instance, in Western Europe or in the USA and Canada. Physicians
are still regarded as omnipotent white magicians by most of the CEE people because of
asymmetric information between them. Two-sided information asymmetry character-
izes the relationship of medical institutions and the government.
Based on the results derived from the models, it can be concluded that asymmetric
information between the different parties at successive levels of the health care system
renders it reasonable, even necessary to incentivize the actors who possess private
information in the form of an information rent. However, the most important finding of
this analysis is that if there is two-sided information asymmetry between the transacting
parties at different levels (i.e. the low level of trust between the transacting parties), then
the incentivization system between the service providers and the buyers, (i.e., the hospital
or the government agencies) turns out to be a perverse one. It is called a perverse incentive
system in this paper, because it punishes the efficient doctor or medical unit, while it
extends rewards to the inefficient one. Double information asymmetry in the Hungarian
and other CEE health care systems largely contributed to their degradation and deepening
crisis. An adverse effect of these changes was that a large number of health care
professionals became fed upwith their deterioratingworking conditions. These employees
left the health care sector. Many of them even left their home country and emigrated to
other, more advanced countries. (e.g., Hárs 2013 and Varga 2016).
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